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INFANTS-Foster Families-Removal of Foster Children From
Foster Homes Without a Prior Hearing Violates Their Constitu-
tional Rights to Procedural Due Process. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Aug. 9,
1976) (No. 76-183).
Plaintiffs, the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform (OFFER) and three individual foster familes,' brought a
class action2 against defendants, administrators and executive
directors of various social service agencies.3 Plaintiffs requested a
1. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp.
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1976) (No. 76-183).
(N.B. The majority opinion had been reported in the advance sheets at 411 F. Supp. 1144;
however, the dissent was not printed. After the West Publishing Co. became aware of the
omission, it decided to remove the case from the bound volumes of 411 Federal Supplement
and print it in its entirety (i.e. both majority and dissenting opinions) in a later volume of
the Federal Supplement. As this Casenote went to press, the case was published in volume
418 of the Federal Supplement advance sheets.)
Seven foster children lived with their respective foster parents, the Smiths, Lhotans and
Goldbergs, for more than one year. The Catholic Guardian Society notified Mrs. Madeline
Smith that her foster children, Eric and Danielle Gandy would be removed from her care
because "it is now in their best interests to leave your home." The agency was concerned that
her arthritis would interfere with her ability to supervise the increasingly active children.
Mrs. Smith refused to let the children go and the agency informed her they would be forcibly
taken from her. It was at this time that this action was begun.
The Nassau County Department of Social Services Children's Bureau informed Mr. and
Mrs. Lhotan that their foster children would be removed from their home because the four
girls were growing too attached to their foster family. The Lhotans requested a temporary
restraining order which Judge Robert Carter granted on July 8, 1974. It was dissolved March
3, 1975. At the same time Patricia Wallace, the biological mother, began habeas corpus
proceedings in the state court to secure the return of her children. On February 23, 1976 the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld a
lower court ruling ordering the removal of the children from the Lhotan home. 418 F. Supp.
at 279-80.
The Goldbergs, the third plaintiff foster family, received unofficial information that Rafael
would be removed from their home to live with his aunt. They joined in the class action to
insure that they would be entitled to a pre-removal hearing if and when such a decision was
made. Id.
2. Intervenor-defendants, the biological parents, asked the court to certify as a class all
natural parents who have voluntarily placed children in foster care. Plaintiff foster parents
moved pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to certify all foster parents
having a foster child who has lived continuously with them for over one year. Judge Carter
granted the motions and certified each group as a class. Id. at 278 n.3.
3. The defendants included: James Dumpson, individually and as Administrator of the
New York City Human Resources Administration; Elizabeth Beine, individually and as
Director of the New York City Bureau of Child Welfare and as Acting Assistant Administrator
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declaration that the statutes4 and administrative rule5 authorizing
removal of foster children from foster homes without a prior hearing
violated the children's constitutional rights' to equal protection and
due process. The applicable statutory scheme permitted the re-
moval of a foster child from a foster home, on ten days notice, at
the discretion of the social services agency. Under these procedures,
an aggrieved party could request a conference with the agency to
discuss the removal but could not formally contest the removal.7
In a two to one decision, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the removal of foster chil-
dren from foster homes in which they had been living for more than
one year, without a prior hearing, violated the procedural due pro-
of New York City Special Services for Children; Adolin Dall, individually and as Director of
the Division of Interagency Relationships of the Bureau of Child Welfare; James P. O'Neill,
individually and as Executive Director of Catholic Guardian Society of New York; Bernard
Shapiro, individually and as Executive Director of the New York State Board of Social
Welfare; Abe Lavine, individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department
of Social Services; and Joseph D'Elia, individually and as Commissioner of the Nassau
County Department of Social Services. Id. at 277-78.
4. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1976) provides:
The custody of a child placed out or boarded out and not legally adopted or for whom
legal guardianship has not been granted shall be vested during his minority, or until
discharged by such authorized agency from its care and supervision, in the authorized
agency placing out or boarding out such child and any such authorized agency may in
its discretion remove such child from the home where placed or boarded.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1976) provides:
1. When any child shall have been placed in an institution or in a family home by a
commissioner of public welfare or a city public welfare officer, the commissioner or city
public welfare officer may remove such child from such institution or family home and
make such disposition of such child as is provided by law.
2. Any person aggrieved by such decision of the commissioner of public welfare or city
welfare officer may appeal to the department, which upon receipt of the appeal shall
review the case, shall give the person making the appeal an opportunity for a fair
hearing thereon and within thirty days render its decision. ...
5. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14 (1974) provides:
(a) Whenever a social services official or another authorized agency acting on his
behalf proposes to remove a child in foster family care from the foster home, he or such
other authorized agency . . . shall notify the foster family parents in writing of the
intention to remove such child at least ten days prior to the proposed effective date of
such removal. . . . Such notification shall further advise the foster family parents that
they may request a conference with the social services official . . . at which time they
may appear, with or without a representative to have the proposed action re-
viewed. . ..
6. The three judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
7. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14 (1974).
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cess rights of the children.' It concluded that the danger of "the
harmful consequences of a precipitous and perhaps improvident
decision to remove a child"9 mandated a prior hearing and it en-
joined defendants from removing foster children who had resided in
their foster homes for more than one year without granting such a
pre-removal hearing.'"
The court in the instant case found the specific procedures out-
lined in section 450.14" of the Department of Social Services Regu-
lations constitutionally defective. 2 Under these procedures the only
opportunity for a foster parent to object to the removal of his child
prior to the time of removal was at the conference with an official
of the social service agency. The rule did not entitle the foster par-
ents to examine agency files nor did it permit the "representative"
who could accompany the foster parents to present or cross-examine
witnesses. Nevertheless, while the agency had no obligation to state
its reasons for the removal, the foster parents had the burden of
establishing why the agency should not remove the child. Once the
child had been removed, section 400(2) of the Social Services Law"
entitled the foster parents to a post-removal hearing.
In holding that agency transferral procedures required certain due
process protections, the court relied on prior Supreme Court deci-
sions which had established that children were "persons" within the
8. 418 F. Supp. at 282.
9. Id. at 283.
10. Id. at 284. Plaintiffs, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), also asserted
that "the length of the average child's stay in foster care creates an 'informal tenure' system
raising legitimate expectations that their role as foster parents will not be abruptly termi-
nated." 418 F. Supp. at 279. In Perry, respondent teacher in the state college system of the
State of Texas had a series of one year contracts from 1959 to 1969. During 1968 to 1969, there
was a controversy between respondent and the college administration. In May, 1969 his
contract was terminated. Respondent was not provided an official statement of the reasons
for the termination, and was not given an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the basis of
the nonrenewal. The Supreme Court held that respondent's allegations had raised a question
of fact as to whether he had an implied contract as to tenure which he relied upon and which,
under the fourteenth amendment, entitled him to a hearing to challenge the nonrenewal of
his contract. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Plaintiffs in Dumpson claimed that they had a similar tenure right with their foster chil-
dren and that the state could not arbitrarily upset this attachment. The court rejected this
argument. 418 F. Supp. at 281.
11. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14 (1974).
12. 418 F. Supp. at 284.
13. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 400(2) (McKinney 1976).
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meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In In re Gault,4 the Su-
preme Court held that juveniles accused of delinquent behavior
came within the protection of the due process clause and thus had
a right to a fair hearing before the state could deprive them of their
liberty.' In Goss v. Lopez," the Court held that the state could not
deprive a student of an opportunity to pursue a public education on
the grounds of alleged misconduct without providing "fundamen-
tally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has oc-
curred." 7
The court in the instant case extended the reasoning of this line
of due process cases. In the best interests of the child and to avoid
the risk of harmful dislocations,"8 the court provided guidelines
which social service agencies must follow before transferring a foster
child.5
The primary requirement established was the necessity of a hear-
ing prior to transfer of the foster child. At the hearing, all concerned
parties including the foster parents, the child, and the biological
parent may present any relevant information to the administrative
decisionmaker charged with determining the future placement of
the child.2 This arrangement is designed to insure that all relevant
information is available to the hearing officer. The court stated:2
[W]hen the question is whether a foster child is to be moved from one foster
home to another, the state in its parens patriae capacity, will be better able
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. Id. at 31-57. The Court established the following requirements for procedural due
process: (1) The notice must be timely, in writing, and indicate the specific charge or factual
allegation to be considered at the hearing; (2) The right to counsel must be available at the
proceedings; and (3) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be preserved.
Id. at 57.
16. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
17. The procedures the court established were: (1) The student must be given oral or
written notice of the charges against him; and (2) The student must receive a hearing where
he has the opportunity to present his version. The hearing is generally to precede the suspen-
sion. If this is impossible it is to be as soon after suspension as is practicable. Id. at 579-83.
18. 418 F. Supp. at 284. Under present procedures a post-removal hearing may reverse
the decision, but the reunion of child and foster parent cannot erase the injury caused by
uprooting the child. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 282. The court stated that although the decision was limited to the class repre-
sented in the action (i.e. all children in foster care for one year or longer) a similar result would
be in the best interests of a child placed in a foster home for long term care. Id.
21. Id. at 283.
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to make an informed decision after a hearing at which all relevant informa-
tion has been presented.
This hearing is required in all cases, and its commencement is not
dependent upon the initiative of third persons." The court noted
that in some cases there may be a conflict between the interests of
the foster parents and the best interests of the child. The require-
ment of a mandatory hearing protects the foster child from the
situation where the foster parents may have interests adverse to
those of the child and may decide not to request a hearing.
The court also considered the need for adequate representation of
the child's best interests at the hearing. It advised that under cer-
tain circumstances the social service agency should appoint an
adult to represent the interests of the child. 3 In making this deter-
mination, the agency should consider the child's age, sophistication,
and ability to communicate his feelings effectively.24 The represent-
ative need not be an attorney25 since this would give the proceeding
an adversary cast. The court stated specifically that an adversarial
hearing is not a constitutional requisite for minimal due process.2"
Furthermore, it was reluctant to impose such strict requirements
upon trained social workers. The court indicated it would allow
state and local officials to formulate specific procedures in accord
with the principles outlined in the opinion. 7
22. Id. at 285.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 286.
25. Id. Baskin, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974) discusses the need to solicit the choice of a competent child in
order to serve the best interests of the child. The note discusses the state's intervention into
the parents' rights regarding their child's upbringing. It refers to natural parents, but the
analysis of soliciting the child's preferences can be applied where a foster child is being
removed from his foster home at the discretion of the state. The note states that the child's
preference can be solicited either by expert testimony or by directly asking the child, once it
has been established that he is of sufficient age, mental capacity and independence. "If the
children's wishes are to be respected, they must be sought out. Id. at 1405.
26. 418 F. Supp. at 286.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that although due
process requires a hearing before a prisoner can be denied his "good-time" or be confined in
solitary, there is no constitutional requisite that the inmate have an attorney for his hearing.
"The insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings
a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional
goals." Id. at 570.
27. 418 F. Supp. at 286.
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While this case was pending, New York City revised its proce-
dures regulating the transfer of foster children from foster homes."
The Dumpson court found these revised procedures a "significant
improvement over the agency conference and post-removal hear-
ing." The new rules mandated a pre-removal independent review
at the foster parents' request. They also provided that a supervisory
official, who had no previous involvement with the decision to re-
move the child, would review the case. At the hearing, the foster
parents and the agency could be represented by counsel and each
could present witnesses and evidence. The witnesses had to be
sworn, and all testimony was subject to cross-examination. The
agency's files used to support the proposal to remove the child were
open to examination by counsel for the foster parents. The rules also
entitled the parties to a recording of the hearing at cost.
Furthermore, they required that the hearing official issue a decision,
within five days. The hearing official also had to notify the foster
parents of their right to request a post-removal hearing.'"
Despite the improvements, the Dumpson court also found the
revised New York City procedures constitutionally defective.31 The
court held that these procedures were faulty since they provided for
a hearing only upon request.2 Moreover, where the transfer involved
was from a foster home to the child's natural parents, the revised
procedures did not provide for a hearing, even upon request. The
court held that the requirements of due process do not distinguish
between natural and foster parents, and that a hearing is mandatory
in both situations.3 The Dumpson court also indicated that the
revised New York City procedures failed to provide for an indepen-
dent representative to protect the interests of the child. 4
Plaintiffs in Dumpson raised an equal protection issue which the
28. 418 F. Supp. at 278 n.4. The court indicated that these revised procedures were out-
lined in New York City's internal memorandum of August 5, 1974. Id. at 285.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. See In re Beste, 515 S.w.2d 530 (Mo. 1974) (the issue of whether due process
required a hearing prior to termination of legal custody was raised but was not decided by
the court); see also Henry, Preadoptive Parents-Right To Due Process Hearing Prior To
Custody Termination, 40 Mo. L. REv. 380 (1975).
33. 418 F. Supp. at 285.
34. Id.
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court termed "novel" but did not decide." Plaintiffs argued that a
foster home was "entitled to the same constitutional deference as
that long granted to the more traditional biological family."3' They
argued that the Supreme Court had indicated its willingness to look
beyond legal formalities when determining what will be considered
a "family. 37 In Stanley v. Illinois,'3 the state had taken the children
of unmarried parents into its custody when their mother had died.
The father claimed this procedure deprived him of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. The Court, while upholding the
father's claim, stated:39
To say that the test of equal protection should be the "legal" rather than the
biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause
necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines as it
chooses.
The foster parents in Dumpson claimed that a family is a psychol-
ogical entity characterized by emotional interdependence and that
a foster family constitutes the equivalent of a biological family.
Therefore, the foster parents argued, a foster family should have
rights under the law equal to those of a biological family.40 The
Dumpson court did not decide this issue, basing its decision solely
on the grounds of due process.4'
Another unusual claim which plaintiffs raised was their right to
"familial privacy," the right of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control."2 The
court discussed two cases where a parent's right to familial privacy
was upheld. Meyer v. Nebraska3 involved an instructor in a par-
ochial school who had been convicted of violating a statute which
prohibited teaching a foreign language to children below the eighth
grade level. The Supreme Court, applying the concept of "familial
privacy," held that a teacher's occupation gives him the right to
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 281.
37. Id., citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
38. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39. Id. at 652, quoting Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
40. 418 F. Supp. at 281.
41. Id. at 282.
42. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
43. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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teach and that parents have the right under the fourteenth amend-
ment to engage him to instruct their children. The state could not
arbitrarily abridge this right.44
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,45 appellee private school challenged
a statute which required every parent, guardian or other person
having control, charge, or custody of a child between eight and
sixteen to send him to a public school.4" The Supreme Court de-
clared that the fourteenth amendment protected appellees against
deprivation of their property without due process of law. It held that
the right to conduct schools was a property interest and that under
the doctrine of Meyer, parents and guardians had the right to direct
the education of their children. 7
Judge Milton Pollock, in his dissent in Dumpson, criticized the
majority opinion in three respects. First, he contended that the
foster parents did not have standing to assert the rights of the foster
children,48 since Judge Robert Carter had appointed an independent
representative to protect the children's interests. This representa-
tive had consistently argued that a mandatory hearing was not in
the best interests of the foster children. Judge Pollock criticized the
majority for reaching a result which purported to apply due process
protections to benefit foster children while the representative of the
children had argued against such protections."
Secondly, Judge Pollock contended that the record did not sup-
44. Id. at 400. In People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953),
an eighteen year old unmarried woman petitioner was compelled to put her child in a foster
home with the understanding that the child was not eligible for adoption. Petitioner re-
quested the child's return. The court, citing Meyer, held that "No court can, for any but the
gravest reasons, transfer a child from its natural parent to any other person . . . since the
right of a parent . . . to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and
beyond the reach of any court." Id. at 468, 113 N.E.2d at 803, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The court went on to say that the primacy of parental rights cannot be
ignored. 305 N.Y. at 469, 113 N.E.2d at 804.
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46. Id. at 530.
47. Id. at 534-35.
48. 418 F. Supp. at 288 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
"No one with standing to claim that the children require the due process protection sought
herein is making that claim .. " Id. at 288-89. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court had held that appellant doctors had standing to raise the rights of their patients who
were not parties to the action but had interests which the suit could adversely affect. 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965).
49. 418 F. Supp. at 288 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
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port the majority's assumption that a pre-removal hearing would
aid the child .'0 He concluded that the only way a child could partici-
pate in the proceedings would be to have a representative, not nec-
essarily a lawyer, represents his interests. He stated that this role
duplicates that of the social worker:'
Rather than relying on the disinterested social judgment of professional
social workers acting under the aegis of well-conceived tried and tested
statutes, the Court's decision embroils the child in legalistic, psychological
theorism; leaving the child a pawn in a game from which the child should
be spared. No evidence has shown that the present procedures are conducive
to or have resulted in hasty or ill-advised separations from the viewpoint of
the foster child.
Finally, Judge Pollock criticized the court's interference with the
decisions of the state legislature." After pointing out that the court
should not overturn a statute "absent adequate proof that it is
irrational or unfair,"53 Judge Pollock claimed that the majority did
not decide the issues on procedural due process grounds but reached
its decision out of sympathy for the situation of the foster parents.54
The Supreme Court has stated that due process is required before
the state can deprive a person of his liberty or property.55 In
Dumpson the constitutional right deserving protection is less clearly
defined than in most due process cases. The foster children here
were not losing tangible property or their actual liberty. However,
the Dumpson court indicated that a child's preference to live in a
certain home is a protectable interest.
In its holding, the court has reaffirmed the concept that a child
is a "person" under the fourteenth amendment with'clearly protect-
able rights.5" A foster child is at the mercy of the state. He has a
right to express a preference for where he will live, either personally
or through a representative. The state should not have the right to
abridge his liberties by denying him the opportunity to be heard.
This long awaited decision has extended some protection to children
in an area where protection is most needed.
Andrea G. Iason
50. Id. at 290.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 291.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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